DoD Report on Demolitions at the Khamisiyah Complex
This "case narrative" prepared by the Defense Department's Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses describes events at Khamisiyah, Iraq, where U.S. troops may have been exposed to chemical agents that are a suspected cause of Gulf War Syndrome. The document also discusses the public inquiry into the episode, which has become ever more controversial in light of allegations that the Pentagon is covering up its knowledge of chemical exposure during the war.
[document begins]
U.S. DEMOLITION OPERATIONS AT THE KHAMISIYAH AMMUNITION STORAGE POINT
Case Narratives are reports of what we know today about specific events
that took place during the Gulf War of 1990 and 1991. This particular case
narrative focuses on the actions of American troops at Khamisiyah. In
addition, we report on when it became known that American troops may have
been exposed to chemical agents there. This is an interim report, not a
final report. We hope that you will read this and contact us with any
information that would help us better understand the events reported here.
With your help, we will be able to report more accurately on the events
surrounding Khamisiyah. Please contact my office to report any new
information by calling:
1-800-472-6719
Bernard Rostker
Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses
Department of Defense
Last Update: February 21, 1997
Many veterans of the Gulf War have been experiencing a variety of physical
symptoms, collectively called Gulf War illnesses. In response to veterans'
concerns, the Department of Defense (DoD) established a task force in June
1995 to investigate all possible causes. On 12 November 1996, responsibility
for these investigations was assumed by the Investigation and Analysis
Directorate (IAD), Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses
(OSAGWI) which has continued to investigate the events that occurred at
Khamisiyah. Its interim report is contained here. In addition, the Army
Inspector General was directed by the Secretary of the Army on 25 September
1996 to conduct an investigation into Army operations at Khamisiyah, and the
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight was
directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 25 September 1996 to review
what the intelligence communities knew concerning Khamisiyah. These
independent efforts have not yet been completed and may shed additional
light on events at Khamisiyah.
As part of the effort to inform the public about the progress of this
effort, DoD is publishing on the Internet and elsewhere accounts related to
possible causes of Gulf War illnesses, along with whatever documentary
evidence or personal testimony was used in compiling the account. The
narrative that follows is the first such account.
SUMMARY
The story of the Khamisiyah Ammunition Storage Point or ASP has three parts:
the efforts of U.S. forces to destroy Khamisiyah, the inspection of the site
by the United Nations Special Commission or UNSCOM, and the public inquiry
into the events that occurred there, "what we knew, and when we knew it:"
The Destruction of Khamisiyah
Immediately following the end of Operation Desert Storm, U.S. Army units
occupied the area known as Objective GOLD and later identified as the
Khamisiyah ASP (which was also known as Tall al Lahm or Suq Ash Shuyukh).
Khamisiyah was a huge ammunition storage site, covering 50 square kilometers
and containing about 100 ammunition bunkers and several other types of
storage facilities. The XVIII Corps (Airborne) (ABN) dispatched combat
engineer and demolition units to Khamisiyah to destroy its munitions and
facilities.
To perform the demolition, U.S. forces set off two very large explosions,
one on 4 March 1991 and a second on 10 March 1991. They also set off a
number of smaller explosions to destroy small caches of munitions and to
test techniques for destroying bunkers. Demolition operations continued in
the Khamisiyah area through most of April 1991.
During the demolition operations, and, indeed, throughout the entire period
of U.S. occupation at Khamisiyah, there were no reports of verified chemical
agent detections, nor were there reports of anyone, soldier or civilian,
experiencing symptoms consistent with exposure to a chemical agent.
Inspecting Khamisiyah
In October 1991 and March 1992, and then again in May 1996, the UNSCOM
inspected Khamisiyah, specifically searching for chemical weapons. Based on
their own inspections and information provided by the Iraqis, UNSCOM
inspectors identified three sites in and around Khamisiyah that had
contained chemical weapons: in an area that became known as the "pit;" in
Bunker 73, one of the bunkers subsequently identified as having been blown
up by U.S. troops; and in an above-ground storage area.
In October 1991, UNSCOM inspectors found about 300 damaged and intact 122mm
rockets in an area surrounded by a berm southeast of the main ASP. This area
became known as the "pit." Their investigation showed that the intact
rockets contained chemical agents (sarin and cyclosarin). During a
subsequent visit in March 1992, about 500 rockets were blown up on site near
the "pit", with the remaining rockets being shipped to Al Muthanna, Iraq for
subsequent destruction. The UNSCOM destruction efforts accounts for 782
rockets; the Iraqis report that 2,160 such rockets had been at Khamisiyah.
It is unknown how many of the unaccounted for rockets were destroyed by U.S.
forces.
During the 1991 inspection, the Iraqis claimed that chemical munitions found
in the "pit" had been salvaged from Bunker 73 and that both had been
destroyed by Coalition Forces. UNSCOM inspectors visited the site of the
bunker, which appeared damaged, and used chemical agent monitors. These
monitors were negative, and the inspectors did not thoroughly search the
bunker.
The UNSCOM team was also shown an above-ground storage site about 3
kilometers west of the ASP containing 6,300 intact 155mm artillery shells
filled with mustard agent. To date, there is no evidence that any Coalition
Forces had been to this site. These rounds were also shipped to the
destruction facility at Al Muthanna.
US intelligence became aware of the UNSCOM findings in November 1991, but at
the time this report did not result in identification of which, if any, U.S.
troops participated in demolition activities at Khamisiyah. The lack of
contemporaneous U.S. reports of chemical weapons, and the fact that the
Iraqis were selective in their willingness to cooperate, as reported by
UNSCOM to the United Nations Security Council, led to the belief the Iraqis
were not telling the truth about chemical weapons being at the site when the
demolition occurred. In May 1996, UNSCOM again returned to Khamisiyah, where
the team conclusively identified debris in the rubble of Bunker 73 that was
characteristic of chemical munitions.
The Public Inquiry
In February 1994, a request from Congressman Browder to the UN for any
reports about chemical weapons found in Iraq after the Gulf War rekindled
U.S. interest in Khamisiyah. The UN responded with a letter in April 1994
which listed Khamisiyah along with other chemical weapons sites. During
hearings on export administration in May 1994 before the Senate Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, DoD witnesses admitted the UN had found
chemical weapons at Khamisiyah but were unable to confirm that any U.S.
troops were at the site.
In March 1995, as a result of Presidential concerns, the CIA began a
reexamination of relevant intelligence. In May 1995, a Presidential Advisory
Committee (PAC) was created. In June 1995, DoD formed the Persian Gulf
Illnesses Investigation Team (PGIIT). Throughout 1995 and 1996, interest in
Khamisiyah and the events surrounding it increased. On June 21, 1996, DoD
confirmed publicly that "U.S. soldiers from the 37th Engineer Battalion
destroyed ammunition bunkers at [Khamisiyah] in early March 1991 ... it now
appears that one of these destroyed bunkers contained chemical weapons."
DoD investigation into the subject continues. What follows provides
additional detail about the events described in this summary. The
information upon which this narrative is based is incomplete. As the
investigation continues, the IAD hopes to answer a number of these
questions, including the following:
* How many chemical warfare munitions were present at Bunker 73 and at
the "pit" at the time the U.S. demolitions took place?
* Were two separate groups working in the "pit" on 10 March 1991?
* Was there an additional demolition of munitions at the "pit" on 12
March 1991?
* Who were the 15 to 20 engineers assigned to assist the EOD
noncommissioned officer in the "pit" on 10 or 12 March 1991?
* What were the weather conditions on the day(s) of the "pit"
demolition(s)?
NARRATIVE (An acronym listing/ glossary is at Tab A)
Introduction
The Khamisiyah ASP, also known to Coalition Forces as Tall al Lahm, Suq Ash
Shuyukh (local Iraqi place names), or Objective GOLD [1] , was a large
munitions storage depot. It is located in southern Iraq along the southern
side of the Euphrates River and about 25 kilometers southeast of the city of
An Nasiriyah. The ASP area borders a major highway [2] used extensively by
U.S. troops transiting the area after the cease-fire began. Khamisiyah was
an extensive complex of above- and below-ground ammunition bunkers, general
storage buildings, and open equipment storage revetments (sand mounds, or
berms) covering approximately 50 square kilometers. The main site covered 25
square kilometers. Figure 1 shows the location of Khamisiyah in the Kuwait
Theater of Operations (KTO).
Beginning in late 1995, both the U.S. Intelligence Community and DoD's
Persian Gulf Illness Investigation Team (PGIIT) began a thorough review of
Iraqi chemical capabilities during Operations Desert Storm/Desert Shield and
the demolition of munitions at the Khamisiyah ASP. These investigations
eventually led DoD to announce that "it now appears that one of these
destroyed bunkers contained chemical weapons. [3] " The following details
what is currently known of the events at Khamisiyah ASP involving U.S.
troops:
Desert Storm Activities
At the opening of the Gulf War (January 1991), the U.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM) did not classify Khamisiyah as a chemical weapons storage site
[4] . However, by late February 1991, the XVIII Corps (ABN) G-3 indicated
that Khamisiyah was suspected of being a chemical weapons storage site [5].
During the Air War of Operation Desert Storm (16 January - 1 March 1991),
Coalition Force aircraft attacked Khamisiyah [6], destroying scores of
warehouses and several ammunition bunkers [7]. At the commencement of the
Ground War (24 February 1991), it was widely believed that U.S. Forces
operating in the KTO after G-Day were likely to capture chemical warfare
(CW) and, possibly, biological warfare (BW) munitions of various types [8].
Accordingly, all command levels issued Commander's Guidance for Disposition
of Captured Chemical and Biological Munitions and other directives for
dealing with captured Iraqi CW or BW munitions (see USCINCCENT on 24
February 1991 [9], COMUSARCENT on 21 February 1991 [10] , and XVIII Corps
(ABN) on 27 February 1991 [11]). For example, the Commander, 24th Infantry
Division (Mechanized) (ID(MECH) [12]), also issued a memorandum on 16
February 1991 detailing the guidance for handling these items. The
handling/disposition of CW or BW munitions guidance documents emphasized
safety and security for both Coalition Forces and the local population:
Destruction of munitions or bulk agent will be accomplished in
accordance
with established EOD field disposal policies and procedures to
ensure the
complete and safe destruction of the captured items. Prior to
destruction,
all necessary measures to preclude collateral damage or down-wind
hazard
to friendly forces and civilians will be accomplished [13].
Destruction of Munitions at Khamisiyah ASP
The XVIII Corps (ABN) had the mission to conduct movement to contact
operations, including attacking and securing Objective GOLD (later
identified as Khamisiyah). On 26 February 1991, the first US troops to reach
Khamisiyah were from the 24th ID(MECH).
On the northern end of BP 102, LTC John Craddock maneuvered his 4-
64th Armor Battalion toward a canal north of Highway
8....Continuing
north, the battalion overran a huge, untouched ammunition storage
area
and pushed the beaten Iraqis protecting the facility into the
weeds near the
canal [14].
On 26 February 1991, the 24th ID(MECH) received information from the XVIII
Corps (ABN) that there were "possible chemicals on Objective GOLD [15]." On
27 February 1991, the 24th ID(MECH) secured Objective GOLD [16] and
continued eastward beyond Khamisiyah to cut-off retreating Republican Guard
divisions near Basrah. On 28 February 1991, the 82nd Div (ABN) was located
west of the 24th ID (MECH) with the "3rd Brigade conduct[ing] movement to
Objective GOLD [17];" the Objective was secured on 1 March 1991 [18].
Although there is no evidence to date that the 82nd Div (ABN) received the
warning from the XVIII Corps (ABN) of possible chemicals on Objective GOLD,
in reporting activities that occurred in securing Khamisiyah, the 82nd Div
(ABN) Chemical Officer noted that standard procedures were followed:
When the 82nd Div (ABN) initially occupied the sector, FOX
vehicles and
unit reconnaissance teams checked for evidence of contamination or
chemical weapons. No contamination was found. Riot control agent
CS
was found in the Tall al Lahm ASP.....White phosphorus [artillery]
rounds
were also found. Artillery rounds with fill plugs and central
bursters were
found. They were marked with a yellow band. They were empty. Other
rounds in the area were marked similarly. FOX reconnaissance
determined
they [the rounds] contained TNT [19].
On 1 March 1991, the 2nd Platoon, Charlie Company, 307th Engineer Battalion,
in direct support of TF 2-505, part of the 82nd Div (ABN), reconnoitered
Khamisiyah ASP and concluded that demolition operations would require
additional engineer support. Subsequently, the 37th Engineer Battalion was
told to destroy the approximately 100 bunkers at Khamisiyah ASP [20].
On 2 March 1991, the XVIII Corps (ABN) noted:
XVIII ABN Corps continues defensive/ security operations in zone
with
emphasis on force protection, clearing of residual enemy personnel
in
sector and destruction/evacuation of captured enemy equipment. Now
that
the tempo has dropped, units are able to begin clearing bunker
complexes
that were initially bypassed to maintain momentum. Divisions are
discovering large numbers of bunkers/underground complexes
containing
weapons, ammunition and other materials. Destruction of these
bunkers
has already begun; however, the enormity of the task before us and
amount
of resources required is still unknown.
***
Commander's evaluation... Our emphasis is on protection of the
force and
operations [21].
Early on 2 March 1991, a platoon from Charlie Company, 37th Engineer
Battalion arrived at the Khamisiyah ASP as an advance party for the
battalion [22]. Upon its arrival, the unit found a large number of the local
civilians and many animals inside the ASP; many were inside the bunkers as
well [23].
On 3 March 1991, the remainder of the 37th Engineer Battalion (-) [24]and
two teams (three soldiers each) from the 60th Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Detachment (EOD) arrived at Khamisiyah [25]. The battalion had M8A1 chemical
alarms mounted on various unit vehicles, and these were reported to be
operational [26]. The battalion's chemical noncommissioned officer (NCO)
stated he was in "MOPP 4" [27]and checked [28]some of the bunkers for
chemical agents. The results of these checks were reported to be negative.
As part of the operation, the U.S. troops searched the site for any
"special" weapons, that is chemical weapons and laser- or optically-guided
munitions. They found one rocket with possible intelligence value; all
remaining were deemed conventional [29]. Two bunkers (98 and 99) were
exploded to test demolition techniques [30].
On 4 March 1991, the three line companies of the 37th Engineer Battalion,
assisted by the two teams of the 60th EOD, were each assigned 12 to 14
bunkers to inventory and demolish [31]. According to the Charlie Company
Commander, "the explosive ordnance guys came through and said, here's what
you're looking at. These are safe to destroy." [32] Therefore, the engineers
planned to use the explosives necessary to destroy conventional munitions. A
total of 38 [33]bunkers were rigged with explosives, including the bunker
subsequently reported by the Iraqis as containing chemical munitions (Bunker
73). Reports and interviews [34]indicate that approximately 300 engineer and
EOD personnel participated in the demolition at the ASP, and about 770
additional personnel from the 505th Infantry secured the area.
At approximately 1400 hours on 4 March 1991, 37 of the 38 bunkers exploded
(explosives in Bunker 92 failed to go off due to a bad time fuse) [35]. The
weather was clear, with winds coming from the SW [36]. The engineer
battalion set up an observation point approximately 3 to 4 kilometers
northwest, and crosswind of the Khamisiyah ASP (see unit location on Figure
2).
At approximately 1445 hours on 4 March 1991, an M8A1 chemical alarm in Bravo
Company, 37th Engineer Battalion sounded at the observation point. Since
troops were at MOPP 0 [37], upon hearing the alarm, some went to MOPP 4
status, and others only donned their masks [38]. Each company and EOD team
[39]performed several M256 kit tests [40]. Two NBC NCOs interviewed say they
got "weak" or "slightly" positive results on M256 tests, although the test
kit is designed to show either positive or negative results. The Bravo
Company Commander observed the test performed by his NBC NCO and states he
saw a negative result, not a "weak positive." The second NBC NCO states he
did a second test that was negative [41] [42]. An "all clear" was then
signaled. Interviews of medical personnel at
battalion/brigade/division/corps-level did not reveal any evidence of
symptoms or health problems related to chemical warfare agent exposure
during the entire period in question [43]. Debris from the exploding bunkers
(described as fragments, and in some instances intact weapons) landed in or
near the observation point, so troops were moved further away from
Khamisiyah [44].
On 5 March 1991, there were heavy rains in the morning, and many vehicles
became stuck. The 60th EOD teams examined the bunkers from the previous
day's demolition and determined one bunker (92) did not explode. The
explosives were re-fused and set off without incident [45]. EOD reviewed the
results of the previous day's demolitions and decided to use a different
technique to destroy the remaining bunkers [46]. Alpha Company of the 307th
Engineer Battalion [47] was given the mission to destroy warehouses in the
NW portion of Khamisiyah ASP. The XVIII Corps (ABN) SITREP for this day also
noted that the 82nd Div (ABN) destroyed ASPs at Jalibah and Tallil. There is
no mention of Khamisiyah or Objective GOLD [48].
On 6 March 1991, each engineer company of the 37th Engineer Battalion and
Alpha Company from the 307th Engineer Battalion exploded a bunker to test
the latest techniques for demolition developed by the 60th EOD. The EOD
experts attempted to implode the bunkers [49] in order to reduce the number
of secondary explosions and to conserve the amount of explosives used.
During 7-9 March 1991, no demolitions were performed because of poor
weather. The time was used for demolition training, rehearsals, and
inventorying [50]the remaining bunkers and warehouses.
On 9 March 1991, the Operations Officer of the 37th Engineer Battalion found
crates of 122mm rockets outside the SE corner of Khamisiyah ASP [51]. A
noncommissioned officer from the Headquarters & Headquarters Company (HHC)
of the battalion was told to destroy these munitions in what is now called
the "pit" area of Khamisiyah [52].
On 10 March 1991, at approximately 1540 hours, crates of rockets in the
"pit" were detonated. At the same time, the 60 remaining bunkers were
detonated by 37th Engineer Battalion, and the warehouses were blown up by
Alpha Company of the 307th [53]. There is some confusion as to whether the
HHC NCO with a two-man detail was the only group setting explosives in the
"pit." Photo analysis of the "pit" reveals 13 separate stacks of material.
The HHC NCO and one of his detail both state they rigged 3 stacks of rockets
for demolition, no other stacks were observed, and no one else was working
in the "pit." However, an EOD NCO says he led a 15 - 20 man engineer/soldier
detail that destroyed approximately 850 rockets (6 to 8 stacks) in the "pit"
on the same day as the "big explosion" on March 10 [54].
An accounting of demolition at the "pit" is also noted in the 60th EOD log
[55]for 12 March 1991. It was recorded that 840 "5-inch" (this measure
approximates 122mm) rockets were destroyed at coordinates for Khamisiyah
ASP. This report, however, conflicts with information provided by an NCO
from the 60th EOD [56] [57].
The 37th Engineer Battalion observation point for the demolition on 10 March
1991 was south of Khamisiyah on MSR 8, approximately 20-30 minutes travel
time by vehicle away from the ASP. Once they heard explosions, the 37th
continued south towards Saudi Arabia [58] for approximately four more hours.
The weather was overcast skies with poor visibility; wind direction and
speed on this date are the subject of ongoing investigation by the Institute
for Defense Analyses (IDA) and CIA.
On 12 March 1991, the 307th Engineer Battalion [59]identified additional
ammunition stores southwest of Khamisiyah ASP, described as "another enemy
bunker complex of more than 400 revetted bunkers with large caches inside."
[60]During the period 15-19 March 1991, the 307th Engineer Battalion rigged
explosives on the munitions found in the berm area southwest of Khamisiyah
ASP. On March 20, the berm area was detonated at approximately 1530 hours
[61].
On 23 March 1991, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, part of the U.S. VII
Corps, assumed responsibility for the area of operations, which included
Khamisiyah. The 84th Engineer Company and the 146th EOD were among their
supporting units. On 24 March 1991, the 82nd Div (ABN) [62], the 307th
Engineer Battalion, and the 60th EOD departed for Saudi Arabia and
subsequent redeployment [63].
On 27 March 1991, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment was told to determine if
Tall al Lahm Ammo Storage Depot South (100 revetments) and Tall al Lahm Ammo
Storage Facility [Khamisiyah] contained possible chemical/biological
munitions. On 28 March 1991, the unit reported to VII Corps that
chemical/biological reconnaissance of both Tall al Lahm sites yielded
negative results [65].>
On 2 April 1991, the 82nd Engineer Battalion, located south of the area of
operations, reported hearing a large explosion in the vicinity of Tallil,
another site of demolition, approximately 40 km from Khamisiyah [66].
On 6 April 1991, members of the 84th Engineer Company and 146th EOD
re-examined bunkers at Khamisiyah ASP, and determined that six bunkers
required additional detonations to destroy remaining munitions [67].
The last American units departed Khamisiyah in late April 1991.
Further details on this chronology are being gathered in the continuing
investigation by the Investigation and Analysis Directorate of the Office of
the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses.
UNSCOM Investigations at Khamisiyah
In April 1991, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 687, setting
specific terms for a formal cease-fire to end the conflict between Iraq,
Kuwait and the countries cooperating with Kuwait [68]. In May 1991, in
response to UN Security Council Resolution 687, the Iraqis declared to
UNSCOM that "Khamisiyah (Nasiriyah)" was a chemical weapons storage site,
although it was not included in their first declaration to the UN in April
1991. This was confusing information because it referred to two locations, a
known site (Nasiriyah), and an as yet unknown site (Khamisiyah).
In October 1991, UNSCOM sent a team to inspect six of the sites which were
not near Baghdad. The site map provided to the UNSCOM Team was labeled "An
Nasiriyah Depot S.W. (Khamisiyah)," and it depicted the layout of what U.S.
Intelligence knew as An Nasiriyah ASP. However, the UNSCOM Team was not
taken to An Nasiriyah, but to a different site, which is now known to be
Khamisiyah. They were shown artillery shells and rockets in two separate
areas apart from the main ASP (see Figure 2). An open area, 3 kilometers
west of the bunkers, contained 6,323 155mm artillery shells filled with
mustard agent. These shells were undamaged and were stored in an orderly
fashion (in several stacks/clusters) under tarpaulins, using the natural
terrain features to hide them. The second area, located in a "pit" south of
the main bunker complex, contained 297 122mm rockets in three to four
"heaps," some of which were damaged but most were intact. Some rockets were
neatly laid out, while others appeared to have been bulldozed into piles or
heaps. Many rockets were leaking, and plastic inserts and other features
characteristic of chemical munitions were observed, so UNSCOM personnel
drilled into one of the intact rockets to take a sample. The sample was
later analyzed and found to be a chemical warfare nerve agent
(sarin/cyclosarin (GB/GF)).
The Iraqis told UNSCOM in 1991 that chemical rockets found in the "pit" had
been salvaged from Bunker 73, which had been destroyed as part of the
demolition operations by Coalition Forces. UNSCOM acknowledged that Bunker
73 appeared damaged, but did not thoroughly inspect the bunker. Chemical
agent monitoring at the bunker site was negative. No other observations were
documented concerning remains of munitions, such as whether there were
observable plastic inserts or other paraphernalia characteristic of chemical
munitions.
In November 1991, the U.S. Intelligence Community became aware of the
results of the UNSCOM Khamisiyah Ammunition Storage Facility site visit
[69]. The U.S. Intelligence Community did not believe Iraqi accounts to the
UN that chemical weapons had been blown up at Khamisiyah by the coalition
forces at the end of the war [70]. They believed the Iraqis were engaged in
possible deception, consistent with the observations of UNSCOM in their
inspections and analysis of Iraqi declarations [71].
Despite their doubts, intelligence analysts initiated a search for any U.S.
units involved in blowing up munitions at Khamisiyah. A response to their
request dated 12 November 1991 indicates that they had "received information
from ARCENT [the Army Central Command] to the fact that 24th Mechanized
Infantry Division was located in the vicinity of Tall al Lahm, but [were]
unable to confirm if U.S. troops did in fact destroy buildings at this
particular site." [72] ARCENT mistakenly identified the 24th Infantry
Division as being in the area at the time, although they had not carried out
the demolition at Khamisiyah. The ARCENT lead was followed, and a 20
November 1991 message notes that "Info on Tall al Lahm Ammo Depot was passed
to ... G-2 Office, Ft. Stewart, GA," Headquarters of the 24th Mechanized
Infantry Division. Further, this message states "info on presence of troops
there and their activities during Desert Storm were requested...." [73] The
IAD has followed that lead; after more than five years, the person contacted
at Fort Stewart has no specific recollection of being contacted or of any
specific subsequent actions taken. Additional follow-up has provided no
further leads at this point [74].
During a March 1992 visit, the UNSCOM Team consolidated and destroyed at
least 500 122mm rockets. According to the UNSCOM press release [75].
on 30 March 1992, the munitions destroyed included full, partially full, and
empty rockets. This number includes the 297 rockets mentioned previously,
which were found in the "pit". In addition to the rockets destroyed in the
March 1992 site visit, more than 200 [76].
rockets were unearthed by the Iraqis in the "pit" and shipped to Al Muthanna
for destruction. More than 700 rockets or major rocket parts in all were
found in the "pit" area. The actual number of rockets in the "pit" and
Bunker 73 is unknown, and continues to be topic of questioning during
interviews with 1-800 callers and other interviewees.
The Public Inquiry
In February 1994, Congressman Browder (D-AL) requested from the UN any
reports pertaining to chemical weapons found in Iraq after the Gulf War. The
UN responded by letter in April 1994, providing in tabular format a listing
of the sites at which Iraqi chemical warfare agents/weapons were found.
Included in this listing was the "Khamisiyah Storage Site." [77].
In May 1994, witnesses from DoD testified before the Senate Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee (the Riegle Committee) on matters
relating to export administration. In the course of that testimony, DoD
witnesses acknowledged that the UN had found chemical munitions at a site,
15 nautical miles from An Nasiriyah, but stated that U.S. forces were not at
that site, which they said was north of the Euphrates River [78]. Review of
the testimony and responses to questions for the record submitted by DoD in
September and October 1994 reveals that there was true confusion as to the
location of Khamisiyah and its proximity to US troops. Furthermore, DoD
believed that any destruction of chemical munitions at this "other site"
(Khamisiyah) probably had occurred after the war as part of an Iraqi
deception campaign. [79].
This belief formed the basis for information provided to the Defense Science
Board Task Force Persian Gulf War Health Effects in June 1994. The Task
Force report stated that:
There were also reports of damage by the United Nations Special
Commission inspection team that visited a different location in
the general
vicinity of An Nasiriyah several months after the cessation of
hostilities.
There are indications that the site visited by the UNSCOM team was
not a
site targeted during the air war but may have been specially
constructed for
the UN inspectors.
In November 1994, Congress directed the expansion of a DoD Gulf War
registry, to include all service members [81]. The agency tasked with
responsibility for compiling the unit locator database was the Environmental
Support Group (ESG) (now referred to as the U.S. Armed Services Center for
Research of Unit Records). The ESG unit locator database incorporates all
available coordinates (both latitude/longitude and universal trans-mercator
indices) derived from unit logs, situation reports, etc. It reports the
location of many, but not all, of the U.S. units in Iraq and Saudi Arabia
during the conduct of the Gulf War by unit identification codes (UICs) and
time.
In March 1995, the President directed [82] a more intensive effort to
discover the causes of illnesses among Gulf War veterans. As concern over
the Gulf War illnesses mounted the Acting Director Central Intelligence
directed the CIA to conduct a comprehensive review of relevant intelligence
information. In this review the CIA focused on identifying and quantifying
Iraqi chemical, biological, or radiological releases during and after the
war that could have reached U.S. troops [83]. As part of the President's
initiative, the DoD and the CIA initiated new efforts to collect and review
operational, intelligence and medical records from the war. In April,
declassification of health documents started, and in June 1995, the Persian
Gulf Illnesses Investigation Team (PGIIT) was established to provide a DoD
organization to manage the different investigations which were now on-going.
Just prior to September of 1995, CIA analysts resurfaced the UNSCOM October
1991 Khamisiyah site visit report during a re-examination of thousands of
intelligence reports and other intelligence holdings. On 6 September 1995,
the CIA identified Khamisiyah as a key unresolved chemical weapons release
issue, which raised special concern because its southerly location put it
closest to U.S. troops. On 13 September 1995, CIA informed DoD's PGIIT of
Khamisiyah's potential relevance to the exposure issue and asked whether
U.S. military forces had been at the site [84]. DoD searched the newly
constructed ESG unit locator database and indicated that some units were in
the area. In October 1995, PGIIT learned from the ESG that the 37th Engineer
Battalion reported a location coordinate near Khamisiyah, but there was no
indication of their mission. At that time, no follow-on investigation into
the 37th Engineer Battalion activities was conducted.
The CIA continued to monitor the DoD's Khamisiyah investigation and to
conduct their own research. On 26 January 1996, the CIA briefed the National
Security Council (NSC) staff that U.S. troops probably blew up chemical
weapons at Khamisiyah. The Presidential Advisory Committee (PAC) [85],
formed in May 1995, was subsequently made aware of these initial findings.
DoD and the CIA began an intense and comprehensive effort to research and
analyze the Khamisiyah events. Concern about U.S. exposure increased as the
topic became more fully understood. By early March 1996, CIA and PGIIT
pieced together previously unanalyzed information indicating activity at the
Khamisiyah ASP, and, for the first time, they received clear indications
that the 37th Engineer Battalion blew up Bunker 73 at Khamisiyah.
On 10 March 1996, a CIA analyst heard a tape recording of a radio show
during which a veteran (Mr. Brian Martin) of the 37th Engineer Battalion
described demolition activities at a facility the analyst immediately
recognized as Khamisiyah [86]. Although Mr. Martin had previously testified
before the House Veterans Affairs Committee and had been contacted by DoD
after the release of the Riegle report [87], it was not until the CIA
analyst heard the 10 March 1996 broadcast that the possible connection
between An Nasiriyah demolitions and the bunkers at Khamisiyah was drawn.
DoD and the PAC were notified of this connection on 11 March 1996.
A PGIIT investigator contacted Mr. Martin on 11 March 1996 about the
demolition he had witnessed, and, with assistance from the PAC, Mr. Martin
provided a video tape that showed the demolition activities he had
witnessed. Another version of the tape [88] confirms the event on Mr.
Martin's tape as the demolition at Khamisiyah on 4 March 1991. Review of
these tapes has provided much useful information to the investigation by
confirming events and weather data. Unfortunately, no such video,
photographs or logs have been found that document the 10 March 1991
demolition.
On 1 May 1996, the CIA publicly announced at a PAC hearing that UNSCOM had
found chemical weapons at Khamisiyah and, that "elements of the 37th
Engineer Battalion.... performed demolition of munitions at this facility"
during 1991 [89].
On 14 May 1996, UNSCOM again visited Khamisiyah. During this visit, the
Iraqis told the inspectors that the 6,323 mustard rounds had been moved to
Khamisiyah from Al Muthanna to An Nasiriyah in January 1991 after the
beginning of the Gulf War. The Iraqis further stated that about 2,160
sarin/cyclosarin rockets were also brought from Al Muthanna in January 1991,
and stored in Bunker 73 until a chemical leak was discovered, causing
approximately 1100 of the rockets to be moved to the "pit" area in February
1991. According to the Iraqis, this was done before the Coalition Forces
destroyed the ammunition storage area.
On 21 June 1996, DoD held a news briefing to detail these findings on
Khamisiyah. The DoD said:
UNSCOM has informed us that, as part of its ongoing effort to
verify Iraqi
declarations, it inspected the Khamisiyah ammunition storage area
last month
[May 1996]. During that inspection, UNSCOM concluded that one
bunker
had contained rockets with chemical agents. U.S. soldiers from the
37th
Engineer Battalion destroyed ammunition bunkers at this site in
early March
1991, shortly after the war ended. Based on a new review of the
available
information, it now appears that one of these destroyed bunkers
contained
chemical weapons [90].
After the 21 June 1996 announcement, the focus of investigation shifted to
better understand two questions. First, what was the potential for exposure
to chemical agents at Khamisiyah, and second, who might have been exposed.
DoD merged the ESG unit locator database with DMDC personnel databases to
identify the people actually deployed at varying distances from Khamisiyah
ASP in early March 1991 [91]. Efforts are on-going to identify additional
units and individuals which were in the vicinity of Khamisiyah (see Tab B to
this document). In addition, the PGIIT, CIA, and DMDC conducted interviews
with U.S. troops known to be involved in the demolition to try to
reconstruct such information as the exact dates of the demolition, amount
and type of munitions destroyed, and weather and wind direction on the dates
of demolition.
Potential for Exposure - Plume Analysis
The CIA was charged by the PAC [92] to develop predictions of the potential
chemical fallout from the March 1991 demolition operations using, among
other models, the U.S. Army's Chemical and Biological Defense Command's
NUSSE4 transport and diffusion model. The results were briefed to the PAC on
9 July 1996, and on 2 August 1996, the CIA published a report on the Bunker
73 explosion on 4 March 1991. They concluded that the likely movement of
vapor was to the east and northeast away from U.S. troops [93].
With regard to the "pit " explosion, the CIA encountered numerous modelling
uncertainties, especially weather data, and could not come to any definitive
conclusions. On 29 October 1996, DoD asked IDA to convene an independent
panel of experts in meteorology, physics, chemistry, and related disciplines
to review all of the modelling efforts available in order to determine the
potential fallout from the "pit" area demolition. IDA provided a progress
report on 18 December 1996. At that time, IDA reported:
.... continued concern about the inability to describe the many
variables of the
agent-munition release mechanism. The panel agrees with the CIA
that
"huge uncertainties remain" in the number of rockets present for
destruction
and the number of those rockets destroyed. Among the other major
variables
for which there remains much uncertainty are total quantity of
agent released,
mechanism of release, and purity of agent [94].
The expert panel is working with DoD investigators and was briefed by CIA
analysts in order to assess the model inputs and to determine whether the
original dispersion and weather models (or any other models) may be
effective in predicting the possible extent of chemical exposure as a result
of the Khamisiyah demolitions.
Who Was At Khamisiyah
On 7 August 1996, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
designed and conducted a telephone outreach to veterans who may have
participated in the operation at Khamisiyah ASP. Based on a search of the
ESG database and over 100 interviews, the PGIIT was able to determine units
potentially involved in this operation. Individuals were selected for the
telephone outreach based on their Gulf War assignment to one of these units.
DMDC identified 1179 individuals assigned to units thought to have
participated in the operation. Of those identified, 542 individuals were
contacted and completed the survey, 14 were uncooperative with telephone
operators, and 12 individuals are deceased. The telephone outreach effort
concluded in October 1996. All individuals who were not able to be contacted
via the telephone were mailed a certified letter, informing them of the
incident and requesting they share any information pertaining to the
incident through the 1-800 hotline. 259 individuals received the certified
letter but did not contact DMDC, and 352 individuals have yet to receive a
letter because either it is in the process of being forwarded to them or
they have no known address.
The personal descriptions of the incident offered by each individual
completing the survey were analyzed to screen for potential leads for the
continuing investigation. The PGIIT used the data as a basis for follow-up
interviews. Of the total 542 contacted, 39 individuals mentioned chemical
alarms sounding during this period. These 39 reports, and all subsequent
reports of chemical alarms sounding, are the subject of continuing
examination and further analysis by the investigators of the IAD, the
successor organization to PGIIT.
Given the uncertainty concerning the fallout from the "pit" demolition on 10
March 1991 and after careful review of the CIA's preliminary results, DoD
decided to be conservative and notify all those who were thought to be
within a 50 kilometer radius of Khamisiyah ASP between 1 March and 15 March
1991. Letters were sent to approximately 21,000 Gulf War veterans. The
intent of these letters was to inform them of the incident; to inform them
of the potential for low-level exposure to chemical warfare agent; to
explain how to sign up for examination in the DoD or Department of Veterans
Affairs registries; and to notify them of a forthcoming survey to query for
specific unit/individual location information, chemical exposure data, and
health and medical program participation questions. The most important part
of the letter was:
We need to hear from you, not only about your experience in the
vicinity of
the site, but also about any health problems you think may be a
result of
your service during Operations Desert Storm/Desert Shield. Your
timely
response to the survey will provide us with critical information.
If you
have information that you believe would be of immediate value to
us
pertaining to the events at Khamisiyah, please call the PERSIAN
GULF
INCIDENT HOTLINE at 1-800-472-6719.
If you are experiencing health problems you believe to be a result
of your
service in Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield and you are
eligible for
health benefits through the Department of Defense, please call the
COMPREHENSIVE CLINICAL EVALUATION PROGRAM at 1-800-796-9699.
If you are eligible for benefits provided by the Department of
Veterans
Affairs system, please call the PERSIAN GULF HELPLINE at
1-800-PGW-VETS [95].
Mailing of the survey started 10 January 1997 and is still continuing [96].
This case is still being investigated. As additional information becomes
available, it will be incorporated. If you have records, photographs,
recollections, or find errors in the details reported, please contact the
DoD Persian Gulf Task Force Hot Line at 1-800-472-6719
END NOTES
[1] Objective GOLD was a military designation for the area around what was
then referred to as the Tall al Lahm ASP. GOLD was an Objective for the 24th
Infantry Division (Mechanized) during the Ground War phase. The XVIII Corps
Desert Shield Chronology February 1991, 26 February 1991 entry; and
Brigadier General Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory, (Washington: Office of
the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1993), Figure 5-1.
[2] This highway was referred to as "Highway 8" or "MSR [military supply
route] 8." It became the major redeployment route to reach MSR "Texas" and
"Virginia," which then led back into Saudi Arabia and the units' assembly
areas. 20th EN Bde General Update and Unit Location Report, 3 March 1991.
[3] DoD News Briefing, 21 June 1996.
[4] DoD News Briefing, 21 June 1996. Since Khamisiyah was not specifically
listed as a suspected chemical weapons storage site, it was considered to be
a conventional weapons storage site. CIA Timeline on Activities Involving
Khamisiyah Depot, for June 1996 PAC briefing.
[5] XVIII Corps CTOC 26 February 1991 log entry, and supporting handwritten
action message form.
[6] Khamisiyah was targeted 10 times, however, only 8 missions were
completed; 5 were B-52G raids and 3 were attacks by fighter/bomber aircraft.
Gulf War Air Planning Staff (GWAPS) database query log.
[7] When the 82nd Airborne Division arrived at Khamisiyah on 1 March 1991,
they saw evidence of this bombing destruction. Leavenworth 5+1 Press
Conference video, 15 November 1996.
[8] Testimony by General (ret.) Schwarzkopf, 29 January 1997, before the
Senate Veterans Affairs Committee.
[9] Commander's Guidance for Disposition of Captured Chemical and Biological
Munitions, USCINCCENT, 241200Z FEB 91
[10] Iraqi Chemical Munition Disposition, COMUSARCENT, 211400Z FEB 91
[11] Captured Chemical and Biological Munitions, XVIII Corps (ABN), 270845Z
FEB 91
[12] Memo, Commander, 24th ID(M), SUBJ: Destruction of Enemy Equipment and
Supplies, 16 February 1991.
[13] Commander's Guidance for Disposition of Captured Chemical and
Biological Munitions, USCINCCENT, 241200Z FEB 91, para. 3D.
[14] Brigadier General Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory, (Washington:
Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1993), p. 257-259
[15] An XVIII Corps February 26,1991 log entry, and the supporting
handwritten action message form.
[16] XVIII Corps (ABN) SITREP, 27 February 1991, p. 5.
[17] XVIII Corps (ABN) SITREP, 28 February 1991, p. 5.
[18] 2/505 one page history summary.
[19] 82nd Chemical Officer's handwritten message to 2nd ACR Chemical
Officer, 23 March 1991, describing activities that had occurred in AO.
[20] ENSITREP, March 3, 1991. The 37th Engineer Battalion was attached to
the 82nd Div (ABN) for this purpose. The 37th Engineer Battalion was tasked
through its chain of command, the 937th Engineer Group and the 20th Engineer
Brigade.
[21] XVIII Corps (ABN) SITREP, 2 March 1991, pp. 3-4, 8.
[22] Personal recollection of unit commander. Leavenworth 5+1 Press
Conference video.
[23] Documented in interviews with soldiers present. Unit 1SG interview,
Lead Sheet 843, July 1996.
[24] A (-) symbol indicates that the unit has detached part of its unit
strength (personnel or units) to another area or mission. (Army manual FM
21-30, p. B-3; FM 101-5-1, Ch. 2, Sec. IV, p. 2-73). In this instance, the
37th EN Bn had begun redeploying its headquarters and much of its heavy
equipment back to assembly areas in Saudi Arabia. Likewise, the 60th EOD had
dispatched teams to different areas to support search and destroy operations
by other 82nd DIV (ABN) units.
[25] Detailed in 37th EN Bn Operations Log, 24 February to 10 Mar 1991.
[26] Unit 1SG stated, "Each platoon had M-8 on at all times." Lead Sheet
843, July 1996.
[27] MOPP (mission oriented protective posture) ensemble is worn at certain
levels, from 0 (nothing) to 4 (mask with hood, Battle Dress Overgarment
(BDO), butyl rubber gloves and overshoes). (Army manual FM 17-15, App. D,
Section II).
[28] These "checks" were described by the NBC NCO to consist of performing
M256 kit tests.
[29] Interview with EOD NCOIC, Lead Sheet 806, June 1996.
[30] 37th EN Bn Operations Log, 24 February to 10 Mar 1991.
[31] Both the 37th EN Bn and the 307th EN Bn lacked sufficient explosives to
completely destroy all the warehouses and bunkers in Khamisiyah. In order to
complete the task, the engineers made use of the explosives they found
on-site; most of this explosive material consisted of the Soviet version of
military C-4 explosive. 37th EN Bn message, SUBJ: Time Fuze, 4 March 1991.
[32] MAJ Huber's statement on CBS Evening News, February 12, 1997.
[33] Number of bunkers rigged is based on Unit commander's personal log
entries and Leavenworth 5+1 Press Conference video.
[34] Interviews with 37th EN Bn CSM and Commander, Lead Sheet 819, June 1996
and Interview Notes, June 1996.
[35] 37th EN Bn Operations Log, 24 February to 10 Mar 1991.
[36] Photograph of 4 March 1991 explosion at Khamisiyah showing flag
blowing.
[37] MOPP level of protection was reduced (from level 2 to 0 ) based on the
cessation of hostilities. The XVIII Corps (ABN) Desert Shield Chronology,
February 1991, 271940Z February 1991 entry. (Higher MOPP levels were used
when a unit was initially entering the bunker areas. 37th EN Bn NBC NCO
interview and Lead Sheet 1094, October 1996.)
[38] EOD NCO interview, Lead Sheet 1077, October 1996.
[39] EOD NCO interview, Lead Sheet 1077, October 1996.
[40] Leavenworth 5+1 Press Conference video.
[41] Interview of NCO and commander, Lead Sheets 825 and 832, June 1996
[42] This information regarding negative detections is what is known to date
and may be modified as the result of survey information. In January 1997,
surveys were sent to people believed to have been within 50km of Khamisiyah,
seeking additional information.
[43] Statement by Commander, 307th Medical Bn.
[44] Reports indicate fragments fell in the area for 5 to 30 minutes, and
secondary explosions of munitions continued for 24 hours. Personal
interviews, Unit NCO interview, Lead Sheet 1223, January 1997.
[45] Leavenworth 5+1 Press Conference video.
[46] This review of demolition techniques was, in part, prompted by a
reported lack of explosives available to the engineers, concern about the
amount of secondary explosions, and the extent of unexploded ordnance (UXO)
caused by the March 4, 1991 demolition. Interview with unit commander, Lead
Sheet 1266, January 1997, and 37th EN Bn mission update, March 1991.
[47] This unit, along with another team from the 60th EOD, arrived at
Khamisiyah on 4 March 1991. Leavenworth 5+1 Press Conference video.
[48] XVIII Corps (ABN) SITREP, 5 March 1991, p.4.
[49] The test explosions did not produce the desired results. However, it
was decided to change the charger method from individual bunkers to a
singular ring main that included all the warehouses and bunkers. The net
result would be one large explosion versus individual explosions timed to go
off at approximately the same time. Leavenworth 5+1 Press Conference video.
[50] The IAD does not have any detailed inventories of what was actually in
the ASP bunkers and warehouses. Personnel on site have stated there was not
sufficient time to do an exact count of munitions, and that most of the
containers had Arabic writing, which was indecipherable to the troops. IAD
does have an aggregate inventory report from the 307th EN Bn and 82nd DIV
(ABN) reports, and videotape showing inside some bunkers. 307th EN Bn
Operations Summary, and 60th EOD Incident Journal (Desert Storm)
[51] Interviews with BN S-3, Lead Sheet 1053, October 1996 and 307th Liaison
Officer, Lead Sheet 1221, January 1997.
[52] HHC S-2 NCO interview, Lead Sheet 857, July 1996.
[53] Leavenworth 5+1 Press Conference video.
[54] HHC S-2 NCO interview, Lead Sheet 857, July 1996 and EOD NCO interview,
Lead Sheets 910 and 1077, September and October 1996, respectively.
[55] 60th EOD Incident Journal (Desert Storm), 1 April 1991.
[56] EOD NCO interview, Lead Sheet 910, September 1996.
[57] This conflict in reports gives rise to the question of whether there
was more than one "big explosion." IAD continues to seek identification of
the individual soldiers involved in the demolition so as to resolve that
question.
[58] The 37th EN Bn (-) continued to the assembly area (AA ELM) to link-up
with the remainder of their soldiers in preparation for redeployment to Ft.
Bragg. Operations Log, 37th EN Bn for 24 February to 10 March 1991.
[59] The remainder of the 307th EN Bn arrived in Khamisiyah 11-12 March 1991
from Tallil. Leavenworth 5+1 Press Conference video.
[60] XVIII Corps CTOC Journal Sheet, 12 March 1991
[61] Leavenworth 5+1 Press Conference video.
[62] Brigadier General Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory, (Washington:
Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1993), p.326
[63] 307th EN Bn Desert Storm Narrative, 17 May 1991.
[64] VII Corps FRAGO # 189-91, 27 March 1991
[65] VII Corps Tactical Chemical Spot Report, 28 March 1991
[66] Report in unit history file states other U.S. unit was conducting
demolition mission at Tallil Air Base.
[67] 84th EN Co. Commander's comments in the Leavenworth 5+1 Press
Conference video.
[68] A provision of UN Security Council Resolution 687 established the UN
Special Commission (UNSCOM) whose primary Objective was to identify Iraqi
chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles which survived the
war, have them moved to an Iraqi destruction facility, or to destroy the
weapons themselves. UN Security Council Resolution 687
[69] Redacted Message, 12 November 1991.
[70] Mr. Denny Ross, CBS News, 12 February 1997.
[71] S/23268, Letter from Executive Chairman, Office of the Special
Commission, 4 December 1991, p. 2.
[72] Redacted CIA declassified message, 12 November 1991.
[73] Redacted CIA declassified message, 20 November 1991
[74] Memorandum, XX February 1997, Discussions with the 24 ID G-2 staff.
[75] Unclassified UNSCOM Press Release,1 April 1992
[76] Reuters News Agency summary, Subject: Iraq-Chemical, 25 June 1992.
[77] Letter responding to Congressman Browder's request, UNSCOM, 5 April
1994
[78] Transcript of Hearing, Senate Banking Committee, 25 May 1994, pp.
135-137. Mr. Edwin Dorn, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel, Dr.
Theodore M. Prociv, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Chemical and Biological Weapons, and Dr. John Kriese, Chief Officer for
Ground Forces, Defense Intelligence Agency.
[79] Responses to questions for the record submitted to Congressman Riegle
on 22 September and 5 October 1994
[80] The Defense Science Board Task Force Report on Persian Gulf War Health
Effects, p. 32, June 1994.
[81] Public Law 102-109, DoD to Establish PG Registry, and Public Law
102-585, Sec. 704, Expansion of Coverage of Persian Gulf Registry. The
original registry was developed to identify veterans exposed to the Kuwait
oil well fires.
[82] DoD News release, ref. # 116-95, 9 Mar 95.
[83] CIA Chronology of Khamisiyah Events, transmitted to Special Assistant
for Gulf War Illnesses Executive Director, CIA on 24 January 1997.
[84] CIA Chronology of Khamisiyah Events, transmitted to Special Assistant
for Gulf War Illnesses Executive Director, CIA on 24 January 1997.
[85] Established by Executive Order 12961.
[86] Executive Director of CIA testimony before the Senate Veterans Affairs
Committee, 9 January 1997.
[87] Mr. Martin had previously testified before the House Committee of
Veteran Affairs in November 1993, where he described his illness and
reported that he had witnessed a scud attack, saw dead animals, took
pyridostigmine, and was exposed to diesel fuel. Additionally, in May 1994,
after release of the Riegle Committee report, DoD contacted him to ask if he
thought he could have been exposed to chemical agents and, if so, how. He
cited three possible sources of exposure: the scud attack at Wadi Al Batin,
the dead animals, and smoke from a bunker destruction near An Nasiriyah.
[88] IAD obtained an original, uncut version of the videotape from Mr.
Martin's Company Commander, Major Huber.
[89] Extract from Testimony of Executive Officer, Office of Weapons
Technology and Proliferation, CIA, to the PAC, 1 May 1996.
[90] DoD News Briefing, 21 June 96.
[91] The ESG database is known not to be definitive. See the PAC Report,
January 1997, p. 30.
[92] Statement by CIA Executive Director at News Conference on Persian Gulf
Veterans Illnesses, 1 November 1996.
[93] CIA Report on Intelligence Related to Gulf War Illnesses, 2 August
1996, and DefenseLINK News Release 681-96, 20 December 1996.
[94] DefenseLINK News Release, Reference Number 681-96, 20 December 1996.
[95] Copy of letter sent to vets.
[96] Copy of survey sent to vets.
[97] Based on locations reported for battalion-level Unit Identification
Codes (UICs) derived from the Geographic Information System (GIS) [UIC-based
personnel strengths from the Defense Manpower Data Center(DMDC).]
TAB A - Acronym Listing/Glossary
This TAB provides a listing of acronyms found in this report. Additionally,
the Glossary section provides definitions for selected technical terms which
are not found in common usage.
Acronyms
1SG.................................................First Sergeant
AASLT..................................................Air Assault
ABN........................................Airborne (type of unit)
ACR...........................Armored Cavalry Regiment (Army unit)
ADA..........................................Air Defense Artillery
AMB......................................................Ambulance
AO..............................................Area of Operations
ARCENT........................................Army Central Command
ASP.......................................Ammunition Storage Point
ATC............................................Air Traffic Control
AVN.......................................................Aviation
Bde.............................................Brigade (Army unit)
BDO........................................Battle Dress Overgarment
Bn..............................................Battalion (Army unit)
CAM..........................................Chemical Agent Monitor
Cbt..........................................................Combat
CCEP.......................Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation Program
CENTCOM..............................................Central Command
CIA........................................Central Intelligence Agency
Co................................................Company (Army unit)
COMUSARCENT.......................Commander, U.S. Army Central Command
COSCOM..........................................Corps Support Command
CSG...............................................Corps Support Group
CSM............................................Command Sergeant Major
CTOC................................Corps Tactical Operations Center
DECON................................................Decontamination
Det..................................................... Detachment
DIA.....................................Defense Intelligence Agency
DISCOM......................................Division Support Command
Div........................................................Division
DIVARTY........................................Divisional Artillery
DMDC...................................Defense Manpower Data Center
DoD....................................Department of Defense (U.S.)
DVA.................................Department of Veterans Affairs
EN......................................Engineer (Unit designation)
ENSITREP..................................Engineer Situation Report
EOD......................................Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ESG.....................................Environmental Support Group
FA...............................Field Artillery (Unit designation)
FRAGO.............................................Fragmentary Order
Fwd.........................................................Forward
GA..........................................................Georgia
GB..............................................Nerve agent (sarin)
GF.........................................Nerve agent (cyclosarin)
GWAPS...................................Gulf Air War Planning Staff
HHC...........................Headquarters and Headquarters Company
Hqs....................................................Headquarters
HTML..........................................Hyper-Text Media Link
IAD..........................Investigation and Analysis Directorate
IN......................................Infantry (Unit designation)
KTO...................................Kuwaiti Theater of Operations
Maint...................................................Maintenance
MECH.....................................................Mechanized
mm.......................................................millimeter
MMC......................................Materiel Management Center
MOPP...........................Mission Oriented Protective Posture
MSR...........................................Military Supply Route
MTF......................................Medical Treatment Facility
NBC...............................Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
NCO.......................................Non-Commissioned Officer
NCOIC.................................................NCO In Charge
NSA.......................................National Security Agency
NSC.......................................National Security Council
NW........................................................northwest
OBJ.......................................................Objective
OSAGWI.......Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses
OSD.......................Office of the Secretary of Defense (U.S.)
PGIIT.....................Persian Gulf Illnesses Investigation Team
POL..........................................Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants
QM....................................................Quartermaster
RMC.........................................Regional Medical Center
S&S..............................................Supply and Service
SE........................................................southeast
SITREP............................................Situation Report
Spt.........................................................Support
Sqdn...........................................Squadron (Army unit)
SW........................................................southwest
TAC........................................................Tactical
TF.......................................................Task Force
TOC......................................Tactical Operations Center
U.S...................................................United States
UIC........................................Unit Identification Code
UN...................................................United Nations
UNSCOM............................United Nations Special Commission
USCINCCENT.................Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command
UXO.............................................Unexploded Ordnance
Glossary
CCEP Developed by a multi-disciplinary team of DoD and VA medical
specialists, the CCEP provides a two-phase, comprehensive
medical evaluation. Phase I is conducted at the local medical
treatment facility (MTF) and consists of a history and
medical examination comparable in scope and thoroughness to
an in-patient hospital admissions evaluation. The medical
review includes questions about family history, health,
occupation, unique exposures in the Gulf War, and a
structured review of symptoms.
Health care providers specifically inquire about the symptoms
and Persian Gulf exposures listed on the CCEP
Provider-Administered Patient Questionnaire. The medical
examination focuses on patients' symptoms and health concerns
and includes standard laboratory tests (complete blood count,
urinalysis, serum chemistries) and other tests as clinically
indicated.
Individuals who require additional evaluation after
completing the MTF-level Phase I evaluation and appropriate
consultations may be referred to one of 14 Regional Medical
Centers (RMCs) for Phase II evaluations. RMCs are tertiary
care medical centers that have representation from most major
medical disciplines. Phase II evaluations consist of
symptom-specific examinations, additional laboratory tests,
and specialty consultations according to the prescribed
protocol.
Reference: CCEP Report dated 2 Apr 96, can be found on
homepage: http://www.ha.osd.mil/cs/pgulf/18k-a.html
Cyclosarin A nerve gas agent commonly referred to as GF, similar to
sarin (GB) ( see below), but more persistent.
References: Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
(ATSDR). 1992. Toxicological profile for Cyclosarin. Atlanta,
GA: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public
Health Service.
Detection Detection paper is based on certain dyes being soluble in
Paper chemical warfare agents. Normally, two dyes and one pH
indicator are used, which are mixed with cellulose fibers in
a paper without special coloring (unbleached). When a drop of
chemical warfare agent is absorbed by the paper, it dissolves
one of the pigments. Mustard agent dissolves a red dye and
nerve agent a yellow. In addition, VX causes the indicator to
turn to blue which, together with the yellow, will become
green/green-black.
Detection paper can thus be used to distinguish between three
different types of chemical warfare agents. A disadvantage
with the papers is that many other substances can also
dissolve the pigments. Consequently, they should not be
located in places where drops of, e.g., solvent, fat, oil or
fuel can fall on them. Drops of water give no reaction.
On the basis of spot diameter and density on the detection
paper, it is possible to obtain an opinion on the original
size of the droplets and the degree of contamination. A
droplet of 0.5 mm diameter gives a spot sized about 3 mm on
the paper. A droplet/cm2 of this kind corresponds to a ground
contamination of about 0.5 g/m2. The lower detection limit in
favorable cases is 0.005 g/m2.
Reference: Detection of Chemical Weapons: An overview of
methods for the detection of chemical warfare agents;
homepage: http://www.opcw.nl/chemhaz/detect.htm
M256A1 The M256A1 kit is a portable, expendable item capable of
Chemical detecting and identifying hazardous concentrations of
Agent chemical agent. The M256 kit is used after a chemical attack
Detection to determine if it is safe to unmask. The M256A1 kit has
Kit replaced the M256 kit. The only difference between the two
kits is that the M256A1 kit will detect lower levels of nerve
agent. This improvement was accomplished by using an eel
enzyme for the nerve test in the M256A1 kit in place of the
horse enzyme used in the M256 kit.
Reference: Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook,
p. 430
M8A1 The M8A1 is an automatic chemical agent detection and warning
Chemical system designed to detect the presence of nerve agent vapors
Alarm or inhalable aerosols. The M8A1 will automatically signal the
presence of the nerve agent in the air by providing troops
with both a audible and visible warning. The M8A1 was fielded
to replace the wet chemical M8 detector with a dry system
which eliminated the M229 refill kit, the logistic burden and
associated costs. The M8A1 operates in a fixed, portable, or
vehicle mounted configuration.
Reference: Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook,
p. 412
Mustard Mustard "gas" refers to several manufactured chemicals
including sulfur mustard. They do not occur naturally in the
environment. The term gas is in quotes because mustard "gas"
does not behave as a gas under ordinary conditions. Mustard
"gas" is really a liquid and is not likely to change into a
gas immediately if it is released at ordinary temperatures.
As a pure liquid, it is colorless and odorless, but when
mixed with other chemicals, it looks brown and has a
garlic-like smell. Mustard "gas" was used in chemical warfare
and was made in large amounts during World Wars I and II. It
was reportedly used in the Iran-Iraq war in 1984-1988. It is
not presently used in the United States, except for research
purposes.
The only way that mustard "gas" would enter the environment
[other than through use as a weapon] would be through an
accidental release. Some evaporates from water and soil into
air. It does not easily go into water, and the amount that
does breaks down quickly. It is more stable in soil than in
water but still breaks down within days, depending on the
outside temperature (cold weather makes it more stable). It
does not go from soil to groundwater. Mustard "gas" does not
build up in the tissues of animals because it breaks down so
quickly. Mustard "gas" makes your eyes burn, your eyelids
swell, and causes you to blink a lot. If you breathe mustard
"gas," it can cause coughing, bronchitis, and long-term
respiratory disease.
References: Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
(ATSDR). 1992. Toxicological profile for mustard "gas."
Atlanta, GA: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Public Health Service
Sarin Sarin is a light brown liquid. It is odorless, and evaporates
about as fast as gasoline. It is toxic both as fumes and to
the touch. It is not as persistent an agent as Tabun or
Soman, the other two of the trinity of nerve gases developed
in Germany.
Sarin, along with Tabun and Soman was invented not long
before the Second World War by German scientist Dr. Gerhard
Schrader. While developing insecticides similar to malathion
and parathion, he discovered the first "nerve gas" agents, as
they were then called. In 1936 he discovered Sarin. The
Germans stockpiled these weapons during the Second World War,
but never used them, probably because of Hitler's personal
distaste for the weapons (he himself was a victim of gas
attacks in Flanders during the First World War). Sarin is now
known as "GB."
Only very small amounts of Sarin are needed to kill. A single
milligram of Sarin coming in contact with the skin is
sufficient to kill. In a vaporous form, it takes a
concentration of 100 milligrams per cubic meter to be fatal.
Nerve gases such as Sarin are known as "organophosphorus
anticholinesterases" or "OP's." Their chemical method of
killing is to block the enzyme cholinesterase. The body's
muscles receive electrical impulses caused by choline.
Cholinesterase break down choline, making sure these impulses
stop at the proper time. Cholinesterase attaches itself to
choline and breaks it down, thus halting the impulse. Sarin
fools thecholinesterase into acting upon the Sarin as it
would choline. When the cholinesterase attaches itself to
Sarin, it doesn't break down. Thus, choline is not broken
down, and the body goes into convulsions.
The first symptoms start in the eyes, where the pupils
contract and vision is blurred. It causes breathing problems
and chest tightness. Finally it produces vomiting and
headaches, after which the heart and lungs stop as the body
convulses. The antidote is a substitute for the missing
cholinesterase, which is atropine.
The armed forces in the Gulf War were given Oxime tablets in
case of gas attack, which acts to release cholinesterase from
the Sarin.
References: Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
(ATSDR). 1992. Toxicological profile for Sarin. Atlanta, GA:
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health
Service.
UN Security This resolution was adopted by the UN Security Council at its
Council 2981st meeting, on 3 April 1991. The pertinent section of
Resolution this resolution, as related to the Khamisiyah report,
687 follows:
6. Notes that as soon as the Secretary-General notifies the
Security Council of the completion of the deployment of the
United Nations observer unit, the conditions will be
established for the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in
accordance with resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military
presence in Iraq to an end consistent with resolution 686
(1991);
Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations
under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17
June 1925, and to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, of 10 April 1972;
Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the
destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under
international supervision, of:
(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of
agents and all related subsystems and components and all
research, development, support and manufacturing facilities;
(b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150
kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production
facilities;
Decides, for the implementation of paragraph 8 above
[paragraph 6 is only numbered paragraph in document], the
following:
(a) Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General, within
fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution, a
declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items
specified in paragraph 8 and agree to urgent, on-site
inspection as specified below;
(b) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the
appropriate Governments and, where appropriate, with the
Director-General of the World Health Organization, within
forty-five days of the passage of the present resolution,
shall develop, and submit to the Council for approval, a plan
calling for the completion of the following acts within
forty-five days of such approval:
Reference: UN Security Council Resolution 687, dated April
1991
TAB B - Units Identified as Being Within a 50 Kilometer Radius of Khamisiyah
ASP (4-15 March 1991) [97]
The following table shows those units, and reported total personnel
strengths, which have been identified by investigators as being present
during the demolition operations at Khamisiyah ASP:
MAJOR COMMAND UNIT DESIGNATION PERSONNEL
STRENGTH
82nd Division (Airborne) Hqs., 82nd Div 399
Tactical Command Post (TAC),
1st Bde 122
Tactical Operations Center
(TOC), 3rd Bde 112
1st Bn, 504th IN 757
2nd Bn, 504th IN 794
1st Bn, 505th IN 787
2nd Bn, 505th IN 778
3rd Bn, 505th IN 772
4th Bn, 325th IN 774
1st Bn, 319th FA 462
2nd Bn, 319th FA 468
1st Sqdn, 17th Air Cavalry 772
3rd Bn, 73rd AR 596
313th MI Bn 474
307th Medical Bn 370
307th EN Bn 498
37th EN Bn 511
450 Civil Affairs Bn 77
24th IN Division (Mech) Main Command Post, 24th IN 908
Div
Hq., 197th IN BDE 323
2nd Sqdn, 4th Cavalry 404
24th Signal Bn 668
724th Combat Support Bn 855
1st Bn, 5th ADA 635
Hqs., 36th EN Group 71
3rd EN Bn 682
5th EN Bn 807
299th EN Bn 601
362nd EN Co 156
101st Airborne Division
(Air Assault) Rear Command Post, 2nd Bde 87
Hqs., 101st Aviation Bde 146
1st Bn, 320th FA 436
Other Units 2nd Sqdn, 3rd ACR 866
Hqs., 265th EN Group 75
Hqs., 937th EN Group 79
12th EN Bn 747
46th EN Bn 605
264th EN Co 98
Tactical Command Post
(TAC), XVIIIth Corps 219
Artillery (Airborne)
1st Bn 181st FA 443
1st Bn 623rd FA 411
Hqs., 513th MI Bde 197
Hqs., 12th Aviation Bde 146
9th Chemical Co. 41
36th Medical Detachment 58
5th Mobile Army Surgical
Hospital 150
41st Medical Hospital 247
47th Combat Support
Hospital 234
47th Field Hospital 284
Total 20,867
The following units have been identified to the IAD through contacts with
commanding officers. The IAD is providing this information to a separate
team whose focus is to verify unit locations :
24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)
1st Bde: 2nd Bde: 197th IN Bde:
HHC 1st Bde HHC 2nd Bde HHC 197th
2/7th IN Bn 3/15 IN Bn 1/18th IN Bn
3/7th IN Bn 1/64th AR Bn 2/18th IN Bn
2/69th AR Bn 4/64th AR Bn 2/69th AR Bn
1/41st FA Bn 3/41 FA Bn 4/41st FA Bn
5th EN Bn 3rd EN Bn 299th EN Bn
24th Fwd Spt Bn 224th Fwd Spt Bn 324th Fwd Spt Bn
Division Support Command:
HHC & MMC, DISCOM
171st Corps Support Group
724th Support Bn (Main)
260th QM Bn:
91st Chemical Co.
110 Supply Co. (POL)
327th Chemical Co. (DECON)
84th Med. Truck Co. (Cargo)
197th Support Bn
416th Med. Truck Co. (POL)
82nd Ordnance Det.
542nd Maint. Co.
83rd Ordnance Det.
24th Ordnance Co.
851st S&S Co.
Medical:
548th S&S Bn:
5th MASH
57th Med. Truck Co.
2nd MASH
1083rd Heavy Truck Co.
10th MASH
514th Maint. Co.
274th Field Surgical Team
460th S&S Co.
595th Medical Co.
541st Maintenance Bn
3/565th Medical Co. (AMB)
226th Maint. Co.
47th Cbt Spt. Hosp.
632nd Maint. Co.
498th Air Ambulance Co.
991st Heavy Truck Co.
34th Medical Bn
133rd Ordnance Det.
786 Medical Det. (KA)
118th Ordnance Det.
702nd Medical Co. (CLR)
690th Medical Co. (AMB)
24th Aviation Bde: Division Artillery: 212th FA Bde:
HHC 24th Avn Bde HHC, DIVARTY 2/17th FA Bn
1/24th Avn Bn G-333 FA (TAB) 2/18th FA Bn
3/24th Avn Bn 3/27th FA Bn
1/58th Avn Bn (ATC) C-25th FA (TAB)
Division Troops:
2/4th Cavalry Sqdn 24th Military Police Co.
124th Military Intelligence Bn 211th Military Police Co.
36th EN Group 519th Personnel Service Co.
362nd CSE Co. 24th Finance Support Unit
264th MGB Co. 422nd Civil Affairs Co.
1/5th ADA Bn Det. 300 Postal Co.
24th Signal Bn HHC Division
1st Corps Support Command (COSCOM)
46th Corps Support Group (CSG); assigned to the 82nd Div (ABN)
171st CSG; assigned to the 24th ID (MECH)
101st CSG; assigned to the 101st Div (AASLT)
If you are aware of units or individuals who were within the 50-kilometer
radius of Khamisiyah who are not listed above, please contact the DoD
Persian Gulf Task Force Hot Line at 1-800-472-6719.
[document ends]
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High-Altitude Photos of the Khamisiyah Complex |
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Gulf War Chemical Incident Logs Missing |
