Depleted Uranium Gulf War Documents The following documents were obtained from the GulfLink Declassified Documents Search Engine. Document A: Depleted Uranium Log Entry This March 12, 1991, entry sheet from the Army's Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Desk Log records a request "to determine: Can a conventional round cause radioactivity when it strikes a M2/M3 Bradley? Did Iraq have any depleted uranium type rounds? What are characteristic readings of U.S. DU RDS after hitting a target? What type/size DU RDS does U.S. have and on what systems?" According to this document, the NBC desk was later advised that "Iraq was never assessed to have any DU type RDS." This entry was made weeks after the brief, fierce Desert Storm air and ground engagements had ended, during which U.S. forces expended ammunition containing the equivalent of more than half a million pounds of depleted uranium. This document indicates that personnel at this Army NBC field desk were apparently ill-advised of the hazards of depleted uranium. Document B: Post-Battle Radiation Hazards This document from the Army's 7th Corps outlines post-battle radiation hazards from depleted uranium, stating that "Many soldiers and leaders did not recognize the hazard and put themselves at risk by crawling over shot up or burned up tanks," proving that ground troops were not advised of the most basic DU dangers and precautions. This document also states that "Units do not have the capability of checking for alpha radiation at the brigade level. As a result, they unnecessarily expose their soldiers to radiation risks." Document C: Depleted Uranium Contamination Page 1, Page 2 This March 1991 document provides guidelines for field troops handling equipment that has been contaminated by depleted uranium, stating that "the hazard is not sufficient to preclude entry" into contaminated systems and that "DU contamination does not impose a distance exclusion area." Document D: Use of Depleted Uranium Tank Ammunition This September 8, 1990, Marine Corps document examines questions over whether DU tank rounds could be used in Saudi Arabia for training purposes without the Saudi government's permission. The document states that "Additional concerns were raised regarding the hazard from residual radiation of a spent round: and advises that "all efforts should be made... to 'lay the cards on the table' to the Saudis on the DU round radiation characteristics.'" Document E: Tank Fire Incident Report Page 1, Page 2 This Army Incident Report details a "fire concurrent with several explosions" that broke out on an M1 tank on December 5, 1990. The report notes that "All passengers were evacuated to 1500 meters with no injuries." Note that Document C above states "DU contamination does not impose a distance exclusion area." Yet this Incident Report states that "Due to a possible hazard from the cargo, which includes depleted uranium rounds, the safety radius has been extended to 2300 meters." Document F: Depleted Uranium Memorandum Page 1, Page 2, Page 3, Page 4, Page 5 This memorandum from the Kenneth A. Koetz, Commander of the Army's 24th Infantry Division, dated 29 December 1990, outlines "safe response to incidences involving depleted uranium;" describes wind hazards of depleted uranium and ways DU can contaminate tanks; advises moving downwind with a safety perimeter of 1200 feet; advises concealing points of armor penetration and treating them as secret; describes an intensive dress-up procedure with contamination protection garb; and describes DU ground contamination hazard. Back to Nukes of the Gulf War What do you think? Tell us in the message boards!